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Summary: This article deals with the role of bargaining power in shaping workers’ willingness to accept fixed-term jobs. It
is assumed that workers prefer permanent contracts but may be willing to compromise on job security under certain con-
ditions. To what extent is the willingness to accept fixed-term contracts influenced by personal characteristics and contex-
tual factors that shape individuals’ bargaining power vis--vis employers? In a factorial survey implemented within the Ger-
man panel study “Labour Market and Social Security” (PASS) approx. 3,700 respondents evaluated more than 18,000
short descriptions (vignettes) of hypothetical job offers with an experimental variation of job characteristics, including con-
tract type. Results show that better labor market integration and economic resources of the respondents reduce the willing-
ness to accept insecure jobs. The effect of a better bargaining position also shows up in the higher level of financial compen-
sation required for fixed-term contracts. Moreover, some variation by family background and gender has been found.
Keywords: Social Inequality; Labor Market; Fixed-term Contracts; Labor Supply; Bargaining Power; Experiment, Fac-
torial Survey; PASS.
Zusammenfassung: Welche Rolle spielt die Verhandlungsmacht von Arbeitnehmern für ihre Bereitschaft, befristete Ar-
beitsverträge zu akzeptieren? In welchem Ausmaß ist ihre Konzessionsbereitschaft durch individuelle Merkmale oder
Kontextfaktoren beeinflusst, welche die Verhandlungsmacht gegenüber Arbeitgebern bestimmen? In einem faktoriellen
Survey-Modul wurden im Panel „Arbeitsmarkt und soziale Sicherung“ (PASS) im Jahr 2011 etwa 3.700 Erwerbsperso-
nen in Deutschland zu ihrer Annahmebereitschaft hinsichtlich fiktiver Jobangebote (Vignetten) befragt, die in Merk-
malen wie der Beschäftigungsdauer experimentell variiert wurden. Erwartungsgemäß reduziert eine gute Verhandlungs-
position (z. B. in Form von çkonomischen Ressourcen oder einer starken Arbeitsmarktintegration) die Konzessions-
bereitschaft im Hinblick auf Beschäftigungssicherheit. Der Vorteil einer solchen Position zeigt sich zudem in hçheren
finanziellen Kompensationen bei der Annahme befristeter Verträge. Dabei finden sich Variationen nach familiärem Hin-
tergrund und Geschlecht.
Schlagworte: Soziale Ungleichheit; Arbeitsmarkt; Befristete Beschäftigung; Arbeitsangebot; Verhandlungsmacht; Experi-
ment; Faktorieller Survey; PASS.
1 Introduction
For more than two decades high unemployment
rates, increasing global competition, and economic
uncertainty have been exerting pressure on Western
economies to embrace greater flexibility. As a con-
sequence of labor market de-regulation, there has
been a shift from standard to non-standard employ-
ment relationships, like part-time or marginal em-
ployment, freelance work and temporary jobs in
many European countries (Walwei 2013). Germany
adopted several strategies of labor market de-regu-
lation, one of which is loosening employment pro-
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tection by promoting fixed-term employment. This
approach has been called a “controlled experi-
ment” (see Regini 2000 for an example comparing
Germany with other European countries), implying
a reduction in employment security for part of the
labour force without abandoning employment pro-
tection as a whole. Fixed-term contracts are partic-
ularly widespread among previously unemployed
and low-skilled workers, but also among young
graduates without work experience (Gebel & Gie-
secke 2011).
Thus employment insecurity has become an even
more important dimension of social inequality.
First of all, fixed-term workers’ wages are, on aver-
age, lower than those of permanent workers – even
when differences in workers’ qualifications or job
characteristics are taken into account (Giesecke
2009). Moreover, fixed-term employment can have
adverse health effects (Gash et. al 2007; Strandh
2000), which has been explained by the fact that
unlike permanent employment temporary jobs do
not fully meet basic psycho-social needs, like the
opportunity for establishing social contacts, partici-
pation in collective purposes, or social status and
identity (Jahoda 1981). For similar reasons insecure
employment also affects workers’ sense of being
affiliated to society: Perceived social integration is
weaker among workers in temporary than among
those in permanent jobs (Gundert & Hohendanner
2014).
This paper deals with the reasons for which work-
ers accept unfavourable working conditions like
fixed-term contracts (hereafter: FTCs). Most pre-
vious studies only focused on employers’ motives
for using FTCs, most notably screening or flexibili-
zation strategies. A full understanding of the condi-
tions under which FTCs come about requires, how-
ever, also the consideration of the worker’s
perspective. For instance, Breen (1997) argues that
while the prevalence of standard employment in
the 1970s and 1980s implied hedging against mar-
ket risks and thus decommodification of large parts
of the workforce, the recent increase of non-stand-
ard employment represents a shift of risks from em-
ployers to workers. The degree to which workers
are affected by this process is assumed to be related
to factors determining their relative bargaining po-
sition, like their social class position or the degree
to which their skills are demanded. Workers with
more bargaining power are expected to succeed in
maintaining privileges in terms of wages and job se-
curity, which in turn reinforces their favorable bar-
gaining position. By contrast, workers with little
bargaining power bear the highest risk of employ-
ment insecurity. According to this view, there are
path-dependencies between different forms of so-
cial inequality. However, the prevalence of unem-
ployment and non-standard employment also gave
rise to the contrasting hypothesis of an individuali-
zation of labor market risks (Beck 1992). Propo-
nents of this argument maintain that the relation-
ship between social status and the distribution of
risk has become loose, while individual risk factors
have gained in importance.
Using the example of fixed-term jobs as one type of
non-standard employment, we seek to find out to
what extent current labor market inequalities are
indeed shaped by power imbalances between em-
ployers and employees. So far, data restrictions ren-
dered conclusions on the role of workers’ bargain-
ing power difficult. Most data sets contain
information on accepted job offers only but not on
declined ones. Thus it is impossible to determine to
what extent the distribution of FTCs is mainly
caused by employers’ motives in making selective
job offers (associated, perhaps, with the fact that
FTCs are more predominant in some industries) or
also by variations in workers’ capacities to avoid
unfavorable working conditions. Another difficulty
is that even individuals with relatively high levels of
bargaining power might be willing to accept FTCs,
as they are at the same time better able than others
to trade off job security against more favorable job
attributes. Compensations for job insecurity are,
however, difficult to identify in existing register and
survey data.
Against this background, the present study is the
first to address these issues with an experimental
approach. In the large-scale German panel study
PASS (see below, Section 4.2) respondents were
asked to evaluate their willingness to accept hypo-
thetical job offers described in short text vignettes
with an experimental variation of job characteris-
tics, including contract type. By carrying out a ran-
dom allocation of vignettes to respondents, selec-
tion problems are overcome: All respondents,
regardless of their qualification, employment his-
tory, gender or other characteristics, are presented
job offers of the same quality. By focusing on work-
ers’ motives only it is possible to conclude how the
willingness to accept FTCs is related to personal
characteristics (like skill levels, class positions, gen-
der) and context factors (like local unemployment
rates). In addition, this design enables insights into
individuals’ willingness to trade off job security
against other job characteristics, like monetary
compensation, thus indicating in what way work-
ers’ bargaining power matters for accepting FTCs.
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2 State of Research
Though in Germany the share of fixed-term jobs
has increased substantially over the past twenty
years, it is still moderate by international compari-
son (OECD 2012). According to national statistics,
about 9 percent of all employees held fixed-term
contracts in 2010 (Wingerter 2011). However,
fixed-term employment stands out with regard to
its relevance in recruitment: overall, 46 percent of
all newly hired workers started their jobs with
FTCs in 2010 (Hohendanner 2013). At more than
60 percent the share of newly hired fixed-term
workers is particularly high in the public, non-
profit and education sector, whereas in the con-
struction and financial sector it is comparatively
low (around 20 percent). As in many other coun-
tries (Addabbo & Favaro 2012), women more
often have fixed-term jobs than men. This is largely
due to the fact that women are predominantly em-
ployed in sectors with comparatively high propor-
tions of FTCs, like the education, health or non-
profit sectors (Hohendanner 2012).
Moreover, the probability of having a FTC is re-
lated to individual characteristics, such as skills and
labor market experience. FTCs are concentrated
among young, previously unemployed and poorly
qualified workers as well as those in low-skilled
jobs (Gebel & Giesecke 2009; McGinnity et al.
2005). The incidence of FTCs is, however, also high
among workers with tertiary degrees or those in
high-skilled and service class positions (Gebel &
Giesecke 2009; Gundert 2007; Kurz 2002).
In attempting to find an explanation for this distri-
bution a majority of previous studies have focused
on employers’ motives for offering FTCs. Employ-
ers can use FTCs for a variety of reasons that have
been discussed in detail elsewhere (Gash 2008;
Gebel & Giesecke 2011; Giesecke & Groß 2003).
In a nutshell, the prevalence of FTCs is mainly ex-
plained by screening and flexibilization strategies:
Given that employers are not fully aware of a job
seeker’s productivity they can use FTCs as screen-
ing instruments (Stiglitz 1975), which is particu-
larly likely if jobs require high qualifications or spe-
cial skills that are not or only partly signaled by a
job candidate’s certificates and credentials (Spence
1973). The flexibility motive, by contrast, is ex-
pected to prevail in the secondary labor market,
where according to segmentation theory (Doeringer
& Piore 1971) low-skilled jobs prevail and demand
shocks are typically met by numeric flexibility. If
adjustment of the workforce is restricted – e. g., by
strict employment protection legislation, as in the
case of Germany – one way to increase flexibility is
to hire fixed-term workers to circumvent dismissal
costs.
Demand-side explanations, however, neglect im-
portant supply-side factors, like the job seekers’
willingness to accept a job offer and their bargain-
ing power vis--vis employers. With some rare ex-
ceptions, such as the case of seasonal workers (Bar-
bieri & Sestito 2012), it can be assumed that higher
job security will be experienced as higher job qual-
ity. The opposing assumption that FTCs might be
preferred seems extremely unlikely given that in
Germany permanent employees have the legal right
to quit their jobs at any time within a specified
period of notice, whereas an early termination of a
FTC requires the employers’ agreement.
This raises the difficult question of why workers
nonetheless accept fixed-term jobs. Unfortunately,
there is a lack of reliable large-scale survey data on
workers’ motivations. The EU Labour Force Survey
(LSF) includes questions intended to differentiate
between workers who voluntarily take up fixed-
term jobs (as they do not wish a permanent posi-
tion) and those who accept FTCs for lack of perma-
nent offers. Indeed, only 3 percent of all fixed-term
workers in Germany do not wish a permanent posi-
tion (Eichhorst et al. 2010), which is in line with
the assumption that permanent jobs are, all else
being equal, preferable to fixed-term jobs. How-
ever, the LFS does not allow clear conclusions on
workers’ motives behind accepting FTCs. In the
German questionnaire there is no precise differen-
tiation between workers’ and employers’ perspec-
tives. In other countries, such as Belgium, while the
questions explicitly refer to individual reasons for
accepting FTCs, response categories (You can’t find
a suitable job and You do not want a permanent
job) do not consequently juxtapose different con-
tract types but allude to further job attributes that
might have influenced the decision, like monetary
compensations or career advancement.1
A plausible explanation why workers might accept
FTCs even though they would prefer a permanent
job might be a lack of bargaining power vis--vis
employers (see Section 3). However, in the absence
of survey data on workers’ motives, drawing con-
clusions on the role of their bargaining power is not
straightforward. At first glance, the distribution of
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1 Thus it can even be questioned whether those 3 percent
of “voluntary” fixed-term workers would not prefer a per-
manent job in case it provided the same employment con-
ditions.
FTCs is not revealing either: FTCs are concentrated
among workers with weak bargaining power (such
as previously unemployed and low-skilled workers)
but also prominent among those in presumably
favorable bargaining positions (like high-skilled in-
dividuals).
There are several explanations of those seemingly
contradictory findings. First of all, the simplistic di-
chotomy of voluntary versus involuntary fixed-
term employment needs to be called into question.
Being confronted with a fixed-term offer, people do
not evaluate this offer solely with respect to the
temporary clause but rather consider the offer as a
whole (Picchio 2012). Besides the inability to find a
permanent position, concessions on job insecurity
are also fostered by factors like the flexibility to
reconcile employment and family, economic rea-
sons, or the hope of using the job as a “stepping-
stone” into permanent employment (Tan & Tan
2002). These motives do not indicate a preference
for, but rather an instrumental attitude towards,
FTCs (De Jong et al. 2009). Likewise, notwith-
standing their presumed favorable bargaining posi-
tion, high-skilled individuals might accept fixed-
term jobs if the latter are particularly well-paid or
socially valued. Indeed, the well-established finding
of fixed-term workers being lower paid than per-
manent ones is less pronounced among high-wage
workers (Mertens & McGinnity 2005). Moreover,
given that transition rates to permanent jobs are
comparatively high for high-skilled workers (Bara-
nowska et al. 2011; Gash 2008), these workers
might use FTCs as stepping stones and thus trade
off short-term job insecurity against long-term em-
ployment prospects.
To sum up, due to a lack of studies on workers’
willingness to accept temporary jobs that are com-
parable to permanent jobs (apart from contract du-
ration), there is little knowledge on the relevance of
workers’ bargaining power in accepting or declin-
ing insecure jobs. This lack of research is probably
caused by a lack of adequate data: It is impossible
to disentangle the different factors that potentially
influence the decision to take up a fixed-term job
with standard survey data. First of all, being a se-
lective group with regard to characteristics like age
or qualification, fixed-term workers probably also
differ from permanent workers in unobservable
characteristics, like ability or motivation. Conse-
quently, it is unclear to what extent the compara-
tively good employment conditions among high-
skilled fixed-term workers represent compensations
for job insecurity or rather gratifications for char-
acteristics that justify higher rewards anyway (Ha-
gen 2002). Another difficulty is that job attributes
and contract type are only observable for employed
individuals. Without information on declined offers
neither the extent to which different workers were
confronted with FTCs at all, nor trade-offs against
longer job search periods can be observed. Without
being able to measure all the relevant job character-
istics (which is hardly possible with existing labor
market data) one risks overlooking compensations
for FTCs that are offered only to some privileged
individuals with higher bargaining power, and thus
overestimating their general willingness to accept
FTCs. Ideally, a correct assessment of the condi-
tions under which a FTC comes about requires the
observation of the same individual being offered a
FTC in comparison to the contrafactual situation
of being offered a permanent contract with same
working conditions. Below (see Section 4), some of
these issues are addressed with an experimental ap-
proach.
3 Theoretical Background:
Why Do Workers Accept FTCs?
According to human capital and job search theory
(Devine & Kiefer 1991), job searchers are rational
actors seeking jobs that maximize utility. Utility is
determined by monetary and non-monetary job
characteristics. A job offer will be accepted if its
quality (i. e. total utility) exceeds that of alternative
offers. However, labor markets are characterized
by frictions rendering extensive search strategies
costly. In facing high information and mobility
costs job seekers with few alternative options are
likely to make concessions on job quality, e. g.,
with regard to wages or job security. Employers can
take advantage of their superior bargaining posi-
tion and induce workers to accept jobs that do not
perfectly match their preferences; see, e. g., Mann-
ing’s (2013) theory of monopsonies.
More detailed conditions can be inferred from so-
ciological class theory. According to this perspec-
tive, an employer’s interest in establishing a fixed-
term employment relationship is antagonistic to the
worker’s interest in employment security. Which
party succeeds in enforcing their interests depends
on their respective bargaining power. The core con-
cept of bargaining power can be found in different
theoretical frameworks, such as social exchange or
rational choice theory (Blau 1964; Emerson 1962).
The bargaining power of actors in an exchange re-
lationship hinges on their dependency on the rela-
tionship, and this dependency varies with the avail-
ability of alternative options. Hence, the more
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alternative (job) options an individual has, the less
she or he is compelled to accept unfavorable bar-
gaining solutions (e. g., unfavorable working condi-
tions). In his class theory, Wright (1997) assumes
that a worker’s relative bargaining position hinges
on two aspects: skills and authority. High-skilled
workers with highly demanded qualifications are
assumed to be in privileged positions that allow
them to refuse unfavorable job conditions because
of their good chances of finding more attractive
jobs. Hence it can be assumed that:
H1: High-skilled individuals are less willing to accept
fixed-term jobs than low-skilled individuals.
Likewise, individuals who apply for executive posi-
tions with high levels of authority and job discre-
tion are expected to be in positions of relative
power as their performance is hard to monitor by
employers. In anticipation of potential disincentive
effects, employers usually refrain from filling those
positions with fixed-term employees but rather
grant employment security and promotion oppor-
tunities to ensure loyalty among employees. Such
arrangements are characteristic of service relation-
ships (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992). Breen (1997)
expects employment security to be an essential as-
pect of high-skilled service class positions. Assum-
ing that they are aware of their advantageous bar-
gaining position, it can be hypothesized that:
H2: Upper service class employees are less willing to ac-
cept FTCs than employees and workers in other class posi-
tions.2
Apart from that, it seems reasonable to expect path
dependencies between current and future employ-
ment status. Compared to employed individuals,
the bargaining position of unemployed individuals
is weaker. Their job opportunities are likely re-
duced due to human capital depreciation or stigma-
tization. Besides, unemployment can involve eco-
nomic pressure to take up any job, irrespective of
its long-term perspective. As for employed individ-
uals, their willingness to accept alternative job of-
fers will be affected by the quality of their current
jobs, notably the contract type. For workers who
already have a permanent job, fixed-term job offers
should appear less attractive than permanent ones.
By contrast, having a temporary job exerts more
pressure to accept even short-term offers. Hence
one would expect path dependencies regarding the
type of employment:
H3a: Unemployed individuals are more willing to accept
FTCs than employed individuals.
H3b: Employees holding permanent contracts are less
willing to accept FTCs than those holding fixed-term or
temporary agency contracts.
Apart from that, the pressure to accept any job can
be expected to hinge on the availability of financial
resources that are reflected in the total disposable
household income (including earnings and social
benefits). The better individuals are shielded from
market risks by such decommodifying financial re-
sources, the better they will be able to decline inse-
cure job offers:
H4: The willingness to accept FTCs decreases with the
level of household income.
The power relations between employers and em-
ployees are linked to the balance of demand and
supply of labor. High local unemployment rates
might exert pressure on individuals to accept jobs
in avoiding the high costs of migrating to regions
with better employment prospects. Furthermore,
given that seeking work in other industrial sectors
is often not a viable strategy in highly-standardized
occupational labor markets, workers’ capacity to
avoid insecure employment is also likely to be af-
fected by conditions in the particular sector they
are currently employed in. It can be expected that
the chances of receiving a permanent job in a cer-
tain industry sector are contingent on the sector-
specific prevalence of fixed-term employment.3 Sec-
tors differ in their average shares of FTCs for
reasons such as: sector-specific incentives for em-
ployers to use FTCs (like the flexibility motive); dif-
ferent levels of collective bargaining power among
workers resulting from differences in union density
or other forms of worker representations (Holst
2014); or different degrees of monopsonistic power
on the part of employers.4 In any case, a high con-
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2 According to Wright and Goldthorpe class and skills (or,
respectively, authority) are closely related. The class of
employees is structured along these two dimensions, with
members of the service classes showing both high skills
and authority. Yet individual skills can be expected also to
have an independent effect on bargaining power. EGP
classes are defined by occupational skill levels – which are
closely related but do not necessarily perfectly correspond
to individual skills. Moreover, skills can be assumed to al-
so affect the bargaining power of unemployed individuals
who are not captured by the EGP scheme.
3 For instance, there is evidence for Spain (Ortiz 2010)
that the higher the overall incidence of FTCs, the lower
workers’ chances to find permanent jobs. Similarly, in
Germany some of the sectors with the highest share of
newly hired fixed-term workers (public and non-profit
services and education) are at the same time characterized
by below-average rates of conversions into permanent
contracts (Hohendanner 2013).
4 In some sectors characterised by state monopolies (nota-
centration of fixed-term employment reduces the
chance of receiving a permanent job. In this con-
text, employers have monopsonistic power to en-
force unfavorable employment conditions. In sum,
we expect that:
H5a: The higher the regional unemployment rate, the
higher is the individual willingness to accept FTCs.
H5b: Workers’ acceptance of fixed-term job offers is high-
er if they are working in industrial sectors with high
shares of FTCs.
Exploring the Impact of Gender and Family
Background
Even though neglected by most prior research, gen-
der and family context seem additionally impor-
tant. While on the aggregate level the risk of having
a FTC is similar for men and women when ac-
counting for the fact that women are frequently em-
ployed in sectors with particularly high proportions
of FTCs, there are still noteworthy gender differen-
ces with respect to specific positions. For example,
women in high-skilled executive positions have a
somewhat higher risk than men to have a FTC
(Kurz 2002). Whether these FTCs are disadvanta-
geous for women remains an unresolved issue:
again, answering that question would require con-
trolling all possible compensations for the limited
contract duration, like higher wages or better ca-
reer chances, which is hardly possible; and there is
even less knowledge on how family obligations in-
tervene with (gender-specific) risks of holding
FTCs.5
From a theoretical perspective, the willingness to
make concessions regarding job security should
hinge on decommodifying living conditions. Hav-
ing a partner who is active in the labor market can
facilitate the decision to reject a fixed-term job of-
fer. In contrast, having no or an unemployed part-
ner should increase the economic pressure to take
up any job. Furthermore, family ties constrain indi-
viduals’ geographic mobility (choices of residence
and commuting distances). Restricted mobility im-
plies limited access to suitable job offers (Mincer
1978). According to bargaining theory, restricted
access to alternative job offers on the part of work-
ers provides employers monopsonistic power to
enforce less favorable employment conditions
(Manning 2003). Both processes are likely to be
moderated by gender. Women more likely than men
have partners with higher earning power (Blossfeld
et al. 2001), i. e., they are more likely to benefit
from decommodifying living conditions. However,
exactly this aspect makes them also more tied to
specific geographic locations, implying a lower bar-
gaining power to decline inferior job conditions
(Auspurg & Schçnholzer 2013).
At the current state of research, it is difficult to esti-
mate the prevalence of the different mechanisms.
Therefore we will explore the interplay of family
status and gender without specifying any distinct
hypotheses.
4 Method and Data
4.1 Experimental Design
To overcome the empirical problems sketched in
the former sections, an experimental factorial sur-
vey method (Jasso 2006; Rossi & Anderson 1982;
Wallander 2009) is used. Respondents in a large-
scale population survey were asked to evaluate five
hypothetical job offers (vignettes) composed of
eight experimentally varied dimensions like gain of
income, career prospects, commuting time and –
most importantly – contract type. About one third
of the offers were described as being based on a
FTC limited to one year, one third were indicated
to be limited to three years, and the remaining one
third as being based on a permanent contract. The
dimensions and levels were defined by factors that
are well known to have an impact on labor market
inequalities and, at the same time, on decisions to
take up (new) jobs.6 When selecting the levels it
was taken care of choosing only those levels that
combine to plausible vignettes and cause sufficient
variation in attractiveness and hence respondents’
willingness to accept an offer. Moreover, the num-
ber of levels was carefully chosen to be balanced
and as small as possible (yielding a high statistical
power to identify causal relationships; Auspurg &
Hinz 2015) but still sufficient for an estimation of
non-linear relations of the dependent variable and
vignette dimensions: All dimensions were com-
posed of three levels; only for the income dimension
more levels (5) were specified. Respondents rated
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bly health, education, and science) the use of FTCs is man-
datory for entry positions and the FTC rate therefore high.
Institutionalized fixed-term job periods are, for instance,
an integral part of training for prospective teachers and
doctors. Moreover, entry positions for academic research-
ers and lecturers are generally non-tenured in Germany.
5 For instance, Kurz (2002) only looked at entry-cohorts
that typically do not have started a family yet.
6 For results produced with a similar factorial survey
module see Abraham et al. 2010.
their likelihood to accept the offers using an 11-
point rating scale.7 The following example illus-
trates the structure of vignettes (varied dimensions8
in italics). The income in case of accepting the job
represented the actual income of respondents’
household plus an experimentally varied percentage
increase (ranging from 0 up to 80%), rounded to
100 euros.9
If you accept the offered job, your net household in-
come will rise to 3,500 euros.
The working hours are 20 hours per week, and the job
requirements are significantly below your professional
skills.
The job offers many opportunities for internal promo-
tion and is limited to 3 years.
The one-way trip from your current place of residence
to the location of the job is approximately 6 hours.
The labor market at the new location is worse than at
your current residence.
Finding appropriate housing there will require consid-
erable effort.
How likely would you accept this offer? Respondents
were asked to report on an 11-point scale, reaching
from 0 (“very unlikely”) to 10 (“very likely”).
A total of 500 different vignettes were constructed
following the high standards of multi-factorial ex-
perimental designs (Abraham et al. 2013; Froder-
mann et al. 2013). Thereby correlations between
the different dimensions are minimized, which al-
lows to estimate their impact with maximum preci-
sion.10 By carrying out a random allocation of vi-
gnettes to respondents it was possible to overcome
selection problems: all respondents, regardless of
their qualification, labor market history, gender or
other characteristics, were presented job offers with
the same distribution of characteristics and also the
same proportions of fixed-term versus permanent
contracts. Moreover, as each respondent evaluated
several offers, it is possible to observe how the
same respondent reacts when confronted with a
fixed-term instead of permanent offer.
Thorough analyses revealed the experimental stim-
uli (job offer dimensions) to be balanced in terms of
socio-demographic characteristics of respondents.
Thus, the random allocation of stimuli to respond-
ents was successfully implemented (see Table A2.3
in the online appendix to this article):11 all bivari-
ate correlations between respondent characteristics
and the vignette dimension indicating the contract
type are close to zero (|r| < 0.025); these very low
correlations indicate a successful randomization
(for further randomization checks see the online ap-
pendix). Moreover, the realized sample was highly
balanced in terms of the levels of the different ex-
perimental treatments – all kinds of contracts occur
with about the same frequency. For descriptive in-
formation see Tables A2.1 and A2.2 in the online
appendix.
4.2 Respondent Sample
The experiment was included in the fifth wave (sur-
veyed in 2011) of the panel study Labour Market
and Social Security (PASS), which is conducted an-
nually by the Institute for Employment Research
(IAB). PASS is designed for research on the labor
market and poverty in Germany (Trappmann et al.
2013). The total sample is a combination of two
subsamples, one of which is drawn from the un-
employment registers of the Federal Employment
Agency, while the second is a general population
sample, oversampling low-status households. For
observing the causal impact of experimental factors
(like contract type) individuals do not have to rep-
resent a random sample. Instead, the random allo-
cation of treatments is essential (Mutz 2011).12
The experiment was conducted by computer-assis-
ted personal interviews (CAPI) of individuals who
were available to the labor market. Besides re-
spondents with missing values on core variables re-
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7 In addition, all respondents were asked to rate the at-
tractiveness of the offer and the likelihood that they
would move to the new location.
8 The varied dimensions and levels were: (1) Gain of
household income (five levels from 0 to 80%); (2) work-
ing hours (20/30/40 hours); (3) job requirements (not/
slightly/significantly below professional skills); (4) oppor-
tunities for internal promotion (none/few/many); (5) con-
tract type (permanent/1-year/3-year FTC); (6) commuting
time (1/4/6 hours); labor market at new location (worse/
similar/better); (7) effort needed to find appropriate hous-
ing (low/some/high).
9 For example, if the actual household income was 2,490
euros and the vignette level was an increase of 20 percent,
the text would read: “By accepting the offer your house-
hold income will rise to 3,000 euros”.
10 In the vignette sample all correlations between vignette
dimensions were close to zero (|r|< 0.04).
11 www.zfs-online.org
12 To provide plausible and meaningful vignette stimuli to
all respondents, including those in low-income house-
holds, the dimension gain of household income’ was tail-
ored to respondents’ specific household income (also see
Table A2.2 in the online appendix and Frodermann et al.
2013).
spondents not interested in paid work (like house-
wives) and self-employed persons were excluded
from the analyses.
A total of 18,366 evaluations made by 3,698 re-
spondents are used for multivariate data analyses.
Table A2.1 (online appendix) gives an overview of
the sample, demonstrating a high level of variation
regarding core respondent variables, like education
or class position.
Respondents’ educational level was assessed on the
basis of the CASMIN classification combining in-
formation on the highest school as well as voca-
tional degree (Brauns et al. 2003). In the analysis
the focus is on occupational qualification. There-
fore the categories were aggregated to three groups:
CASMIN_low (reference category) includes indi-
viduals without any vocational or tertiary qualifica-
tion (summarizing categories “1a”, “1b”, “2b” and
“2c, gen”); CASMIN_medium refers to individuals
who completed vocational training (“1c”, “2a”
and “2c, voc”); CASMIN_high refers to those with
tertiary education (“3a” and “3b”). Employment
status was captured by three categories: permanent
workers (reference category), a combined category
of workers with FTCs and temporary agency work-
ers (TAWs)13, and unemployed individuals.
For employed persons, their occupational class po-
sition was measured with an aggregated version of
the Erikson–Goldthorpe–Portocarero (EGP) class
scheme (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992), resulting in
six categories, of which the upper service class
(class I: higher grade professionals) is chosen as
reference category.
To account for context factors the local unemploy-
ment rate and industry-specific share of FTCs are
included in the analyses.14 To map respondents’
household context, an indicator of the presence and
employment status of cohabiting partners was cre-
ated. Individuals without partners (reference cate-
gory) are distinguished from those living with em-
ployed or unemployed partners.
4.3 Descriptive Results
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the dependent
variable, i. e., the willingness to accept a job offer.
There were only 2.2 percent missing values. The
strong clustering of evaluations on the category
very unlikely fits well to the generally low willing-
ness to move among German workers (about two
thirds of the offers were characterized as being out-
side a daily commuting distance of one hour).15
The response pattern is also in line with multistage
decision processes where only in case of a principal
interest in new options the specific conditions are
evaluated in detail (Abraham et al. 2013).
4.4 Regression Techniques
In accordance with other work on labor supply, the
double hurdle approach of the “craggit model”
(Cragg 1971) is used. It allows formulating two
separate processes underlying a limited outcome
like the vignette evaluations on our 11-point rating
scale. On the first stage (tier 1) a probit model is
used to estimate whether an individual is poten-
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Note: n = 3,698 respondents and n = 18,366 evaluations.
Fig. 1 Distribution of Responses – Willingness to Accept
a Job Offer
13 Given the low number of agency workers (n = 141) col-
lapsing the categories ensures a sufficient number of cases.
The impact of either fixed-term or temporary agency jobs
on employment decisions is expected to be very similar, as
compared to permanent jobs both types of employment
are associated with lower levels of job security and wages.
14 The unemployment rate was gathered from register da-
ta of the Federal Employment Agency and refers to 418
administrative districts comprising cities and rural dis-
tricts. The degree to which FTCs are common for new
hires in a specific industry was measured by the percent-
age of fixed-term workers among all newly hired workers
in that industry, based on information from the IAB Es-
tablishment Panel on 19 aggregated groups of industries
(Hohendanner 2013).
15 Additional analyses revealed results to be very similar
for job offers within daily commuting distance (one hour)
and for offers beyond this distance (four or six hours driv-
ing distance). Therefore pooled analyses on all job offers
are reported.
tially willing to accept the job offer (i. e., the de-
pendent variable exceeds zero). On the second stage
(tier 2), a truncated linear regression model is esti-
mated (addressing the truncation resulting from y >
0). Here, the degree to which an offer is accepted is
modeled (Wooldridge 2010). For coefficients in-
cluded on both tiers maximum likelihood estimates
indicate their effects on each tier separately. In ad-
dition, average partial effects (APEs) are estimated
that summarize the effects of both tiers and repre-
sent the overall effect each variable has on the re-
ported likelihood to accept an offer (more details
on the craggit model in the online appendix). Per-
sonal traits, such as age, family status and all char-
acteristics reflecting individuals’ bargaining power
are assumed to affect both the principal decision on
the first tier as well as the fine-tuning on the second
stage. Similarly, commuting distance and contract
type can be expected to have a meaningful impact
on both decision stages.
For tier 2, job characteristics that seem of subordi-
nated importance (like promotion prospects) are
added. Both models include the same list of control
variables (see bottom of the results tables). All hy-
potheses are tested in the form of interaction ef-
fects: Are the (expected) negative effects of FTCs
on the willingness to accept job offers particularly
strong for subgroups that are assumed to have a rel-
atively high bargaining power? Cluster-robust
standard errors (Rogers 1993) are used to adjust
for unequal variances of error terms (heteroscedas-
ticity). The latter result from the clustering of ob-
servations as each respondent evaluated several job
offers (more details on this in the online appendix).
In all models, regional contexts are controlled in
the form of regional unemployment rates (hence no
additional clusters for regional units were esti-
mated). In the online appendix we provide exten-
sive checks of the robustness of results with respect
to alternative statistical models that could fit the
data structure (Table A2.4 and Figure A2.1).
5 Results
5.1 Impact of Contract Type
The contract type has substantial impact on the re-
ported likelihood of accepting a job offer: The
mean evaluation of 1-year contracts is 2.60, which
is significantly closer to the rating “very unlikely”
than the mean evaluation of 3-year and permanent
contracts (which are 3.07 and 3.59 respectively (a
test of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) yields F
(2; 18363) = 123.2; p = 0.000). This finding sup-
ports the basic assumption that FTCs are experi-
enced as unfavorable working conditions.
5.2 Conditions Favoring the Acceptance of FTCs
The hypotheses are tested by applying the craggit
model (Table 1). Besides control variables, the base
model (Model I) contains six vignette variables –
including the type of contract – along with varia-
bles relevant for testing the hypotheses (like educa-
tional level). Regarding the vignette variables, all
coefficients can be interpreted in a plausible way.
The gain of household income is positively related
to both respondents’ principal decision of consider-
ing an offer at all (tier 1, first line: ß = 0.07), and if
so, the fine-grained evaluation of their propensity
to accept it (tier 2: ß = 0.35). To facilitate interpre-
tation, a third column displays average partial ef-
fects (APEs) that summarize the effects of both tiers
on the dependent variable.16 The APE of 0.256 in
the first line means, for instance, that, if the gain of
household income rises by 10 percent, the reported
likelihood of accepting the offer will increase, on
average, by about 0.256 points on the 11-point rat-
ing scale.
Likewise, the more hours individuals would have to
work for a given gain of household income, the
lower their willingness to accept an offer will be.17
Strong negative and highly significant effects are
observed for FTCs in particular, which corrobo-
rates the descriptive results: all else being equal,
jobs are perceived to be more attractive if the dura-
tion of the contract is longer.
At the bottom of Table 1, effects of the education
variables are displayed; all have negative (yet not
significant) APEs. The right-hand side of Table 1
shows the model (Model II) for testing the first hy-
pothesis that high-skilled individuals would be less
willing to accept FTCs. The base model is enlarged
by four interaction terms of the upper two levels of
education (CASMIN_medium or CASMIN_high)
with the two different FTC offers (3-year or 1-year
contract). While all APEs display the expected
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16 For APEs standard errors were estimated using boot-
strap procedures (Burke 2009) with 100 replications and
the Stata ado craggit (see online appendix).
17 This is a plausible result given that the effect of work-
ing hours, like all effects, was estimated under control of
all other vignette dimensions, including gain of household
income’. Hence, a higher amount of working hours given
a specific gain of household income implies a lower hourly
wage.
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Table 1 Craggit Models of Willingness to Accept a Job Offer (Regression Coefficients and APEs)
Model I Model II
Tier 1 Tier 2 APEs Tier 1 Tier 2 APEs
Gain of household income [10%] 0.0681*** 0.352*** 0.256*** 0.0683*** 0.353*** 0.257***
(0.00453) (0.0220) (0.0104) (0.00453) (0.0220) (0.0105)
Working hours (ref.: 20 hours)
30 hours –0.43** –0.178** –0.434** –0.178**
(0.125) (0.0528) (0.125) (0.0530)
40 hours –0.801*** –0.328*** –0.801*** –0.328***
(0.121) (0.0465) (0.121) (0.0466)
Over-qualification (ref.: none)
Slight –0.155 –0.0635+ –0.157 –0.0642+
(0.0976) (0.0358) (0.0973) (0.0358)
Considerable –0.244* –0.100* –0.247* –0.101*
(0.0993) (0.0410) (0.0992) (0.0413)
Prospects of promotion (ref.: none)
Few 0.0220 0.00903 0.0249 0.0102
(0.102) (0.0434) (0.102) (0.0431)
Many 0.512*** 0.210*** 0.513*** 0.210***
(0.1000) (0.0389) (0.1000) (0.0388)
Commuting distance (ref.: 1 hour)
4 hours –0.607*** –2.636*** –2.078*** –0.607*** –2.635*** –2.077***
(0.0270) (0.113) (0.0697) (0.0270) (0.113) (0.0700)
6 hours –0.810*** –2.637*** –2.413*** –0.810*** –2.636*** –2.412***
(0.0279) (0.119) (0.0654) (0.0279) (0.119) (0.0656)
FTC (ref.: permanent contract)
3-year contract –0.130*** –0.800*** –0.542*** –0.140** –0.562** –0.461***
(0.0242) (0.0984) (0.0586) (0.0460) (0.180) (0.106)
1-year contract –0.271*** –1.262*** –0.963*** –0.244*** –1.055*** –0 .833***
(0.0251) (0.107) (0.0581) (0.0488) (0.195) (0.108)
Education (ref.: CASMIN_low)
CASMIN_medium 0.00138 –0.282+ –0.113 –0.00435 –0.0882 –0.0433
(0.0399) (0.154) (0.0999) (0.0515) (0.187) (0.124)
CASMIN_high 0.0563 –0.299 –0.0300 0.150+ –0.0962 0.207
(0.0631) (0.244) (0.153) (0.0829) (0.283) (0.198)
Education X FTC:
CASMIN_med. X 3-year contract 0.0240 –0.382+ –0.117
(0.0553) (0.220) (0.129)
CASMIN_med. X 1-year contract –0.00597 –0.239 –0.108
(0.0582) (0.238) (0.142)
CASMIN_high X 3-year contract –0.0513 –0.104 –0.127
(0.0888) (0.343) (0.214)
CASMIN_high X 1-year contract –0.222* –0.644 –0.629**
(0.0893) (0.399) (0.214)
Constant 1.343*** 4.407*** 1.337*** 4.252**
(0.302) (1.248) (0.303) (1.252)
s 3.531*** 3.530***
(0.0388) (0.0388)
n Vignettes 18,366 18,366
n Respondents 3,698 3,698
Note: Additional control variables of experimental dimensions: local employment opportunities, effort needed to find appropriate housing.
Control variables for respondents’ characteristics: sex, age, employment status, net household income, migration background, local un-
employment rate, property ownership, children in household, attachment to place of residency, community size, East/West Germany.
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; + p < 0.1.
negative signs, only the last one (the interaction of
CASMIN_high and a 1-year contract) is statisti-
cally significant: compared to respondents with ele-
mentary education, those with tertiary education
rated their propensity of accepting a 1-year con-
tract considerably lower.
In a similar vein, further models for the remaining
hypotheses were estimated. For ease of interpreta-
tion, graphical illustrations are displayed in Figures
2a to 3 (for the exact results, based on pooled esti-
mations like the ones shown in Table 1, see Table 2
below). Figure 2a illustrates the interaction of con-
tract type with educational level as shown in Table
1. Point estimates and 95%-confidence intervals
(CIs) for the APEs of a 3-year (grey symbols) and
1-year contract (black symbols) are plotted. APEs
result from separate estimations of the base model
for the three educational groups. In all groups per-
manent contracts are significantly preferred over
FTCs: all effects are negative with the 95%-CIs not
overlapping with the zero line. Comparing effects
across educational groups, the only statistically sig-
nificant difference refers to individuals with tertiary
degrees (CASMIN_high) being less willing to ac-
cept 1-year contracts than those with lower levels
of education (CIs do not overlap; see also Table 2
for significance levels when estimating a pooled
model like the one shown in Table 1).18
Figure 2b illustrates the results for employment sta-
tus. In line with hypothesis H3a, individuals who
were employed at the time of the survey are more
likely than unemployed individuals to decline a 1-
year contract. However, permanent and temporary
workers do not differ significantly in their willing-
ness to accept FTCs. This does not support the as-
sumption of permanent workers being in a better
position to reject FTCs than those with temporary
contracts (hypothesis H3b).
In Figure 3, effects for occupational class positions
are plotted. Again, the finding that respondents
generally prefer permanent contracts over FTCs
clearly supports our basic assumption of FTCs re-
presenting unfavorable working conditions. There
is one significant difference across class positions:
in line with hypothesis H2 upper service class
workers are less willing to accept 1-year contracts
than individuals from all other classes.
No evidence, however, is found (and hence no
graphs are presented) for the supposed positive ef-
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Note: APEs from craggit models estimated separately for respondents with different educational level or employment status. All estimates
are based on at least n = 1,900 evaluations of job offers.
Fig. 2 APEs of FTCs by Education and Employment Status with 95% CIs
18 The figures (showing FTC effects estimated separately
for the different respondent groups) offer a better illustra-
tion of group differences than the pooled estimates with
interaction terms in the tables. However, due to the higher
number of cases, the pooled estimates provide somewhat
more power to detect group differences. In some cases of
borderline statistical significance the group differences in
the tables might be found to be statistically significant
although the CIs in the figures marginally overlap.
fects of the local unemployment rate and industry-
specific share of FTCs (with regard to new hires).19
Only for the local unemployment rate APEs show
the expected positive sign, but none is statistically
significant. Based on the data at hand, the respec-
tive hypotheses (H5a/b) have to be rejected.
Table 2 finally summarizes APEs for all interaction
terms of FTCs with the variables related to hypothe-
ses. For single hypotheses comprising several inter-
action effects, the table provides a summary Chi2-
test for their joint significance; thus Table 2 offers a
compact overview on the impact of all different fac-
tors.20 The description is confined to effects of the
1-year condition, which are in each case similar to
(albeit somewhat stronger than) effects of the 3-year
condition. These tests again support the expectation
that individuals with higher education, permanent
jobs or upper service class positions are more likely
to decline FTCs than other individuals. Besides,
there is evidence for a decommodifying effect of fi-
nancial resources (H4): net of their educational and
employment status, individuals with higher house-
hold income are less prone to accept FTCs.
Finally, at the bottom of the table, effects for gender
and family status are reported. Female respondents
tend to display a higher willingness to accept FTCs.
Compared to being single living with an employed
partner reduces the propensity to accept a FTC –
but only for men. For women there is no significant
variation by family status. The interplay of family
status and gender can also be observed in Figure 4,
where again APEs offer an illustration of the group
comparisons. The non-existing effect of family sta-
tus among women might be caused by different
causal mechanisms cancelling each other out. We
get back on this issue in the discussion.
5.3 Monetary Compensations
The experimental design also allows estimating the
amount of monetary compensation that would
have to be offered so that fixed-term contracts are
as likely to be accepted as permanent ones. Those
measures of “willingness to pay” for favorable con-
ditions (or, respectively, “willingness to avoid” un-
favorable conditions) offer even more detailed in-
sights into effect sizes of attributes (like jobs being
temporary or not). They are frequently used in eco-
nomics in combination with choice experiments
but can also be applied to factorial surveys. Their
rare use in sociology probably reflects researchers’
unawareness of these measures (Auspurg & Hinz
2015).
Technically, information on monetary compensa-
tions is gained by the cross-elasticity of the contract
type and the monetary dimension that is repre-
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Note: APEs from craggit models estimated separately for respondents with different occupational class positions. All estimates are based
on at least n = 724 evaluations of job offers.
Fig. 3 APEs of FTCs by EGP with 95% CIs
19 Similar results are obtained by using a more general
measure, i. e. the total industry-specific share of FTCs.
20 Moreover, as already mentioned, the pooled estimates
shown in Tables 1 and 2 offer a little more statistical
power than the estimates displayed in the figures (that
were run separately for different groups of respondents).
sented in the vignettes by the gain of household in-
come (see online appendix). Table 3 shows the
point estimates and 95% CIs by educational level
and employment status. Estimations in the left col-
umns of Table 3 refer to the principal decision to
consider a fixed-term job offer at all (tier 1 of the
craggit models), which is a much more fundamental
decision stage than the fine-tuning taking place on
tier 2. According to these estimates, the gain of
household income associated with a 1-year contract
would have to exceed the gain of household income
associated with a permanent contract by 33 per-
centage points on average, so that a 1-year contract
is considered as favorable as a permanent one. Most
important, the estimates again illustrate the sub-
stantially higher bargaining power of higher edu-
cated and permanently employed individuals: re-
spondents with tertiary education (CASMIN_high)
would consider a 1-year contract with the same
probability as a permanent one only in case it of-
fered a gain of household income that is higher by
57 percentage points. For permanent workers to be
indifferent between a 1-year and a permanent con-
tract the gain of household income associated with
a 1-year contract would have to exceed the gain of
household income associated with a permanent
contract by 42 percentage points. The monetary
compensations requested by other groups are sub-
stantially lower but throughout above an increase
by 20 percentage points (point estimates).
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Table 2 Craggit Estimates: Interactions of 1-Year FTC with Respondents’ Characteristics
APE Chi2-Testa (df) n evaluations
(respondents)
Education (ref.: CASMIN_low)
CASMIN_medium –0.108 9.83* 18,366
CASMIN_high –0.629** (4) (3,698)
Employment status (ref.: permanent contract)
Temporary contract (FTC or TAW) –0.0171 20.20*** 18,366
Unemployed 0.537*** (4) (3,698)
Class Position (Ref.: higher grade prof.)
Lower grade professionals 1.196*
Routine non-manuals, higher grade 1.185**
Routine non-manuals, lower grade 1.497*** 17.21+ 9,907
Lower grade techn., skilled manuals 1.085** (10) (1,996)
Semi-/unskilled manual & farm workers 1.22**
Industry-specific share of new FTCs –0.024 – 9,767
(1,968)
Local unemployment rate 0.0186 – 18,366
(3,698)
Household incomeb –0.519*** – 18,366
(3,698)
Female respondent 0.210+ 18,366
(3,698)
Family status
Men (ref.: single)
Partner, unemployed –0.171 9.87* 6,828
Partner, employed –0.649* (4) (1,375)
Women (ref.: single)
Partner, unemployed 0.463 2.56 6,009
Partner, employed 0.0402 (4) (1,210)
Note: a The null hypothesis states that jointly adding these interactions to the base model (Model I, Table 1), does not improve the good-
ness of fit. b Equivalised according to OECD scale, rounded to 100 euros and logarithmized.
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
Similar results are found when estimating compen-
sations not only for tier 1 but by using the complete
distribution of the dependent variable (i. e. using as
dependent variable not only a binary indicator of
willingness to accept the offer being larger than
zero or not but the original quantitative measure-
ment on the 11-point rating scale). These estimates
are shown in the right-hand columns of Table 3.
They are based on an OLS regression because, to
the best of our knowledge, for the craggit model no
techniques exist that allow estimating standard er-
rors for cross-elasticities summarizing the tiers.21
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Note: APEs from craggit models estimated separately for respondents with different gender or family status. All estimates are based on at
least n = 823 evaluations of job offers.
Fig. 4 APEs of FTCs by Gender and Family Status with 95% CIs
Table 3 Monetary Compensation (Additional Gain of Household Income) Needed for Considering 1-Year Instead of
Permanent Contract (Percentage Points)
Probit (Tier 1) OLS (Tier 1 + 2)
Point estimate 95% CI Point estimate 95% CI
lower upper lower upper
Overall 32.79 25.82 39.77 32.51 25.56 39.47
Education
CASMIN_low 34.44 18.28 50.61 33.67 17.81 49.53
CASMIN_medium 27.86 20.03 35.69 27.69 19.85 35.52
CASMIN_high 57.31 29.42 85.20 57.40 28.55 86.24
Employment status
Employed, permanent contract 41.82 30.03 53.61 41.71 29.81 53.61
Employed, temporary contract 37.81 18.81 56.82 37.85 18.50 57.19
Unemployed 22.59 13.20 31.97 22.33 13.04 31.63
Note:All estimates are based on the Stata ado ‘wtp’ (Hole 2007). The probit model only refers to the decision to consider a job offer at all
(y = 0 versus y > 0; which is equivalent to the estimates of tier 1 of the craggit model), while the OLS model considers all possible values of
the dependent variable (i. e. both decision stages).
21 Both craggit and OLS models yield very similar esti-
mates (Table A2.4, online appendix). The similarity of re-
sults for monetary compensations shown in Table 3 again
proves the robustness of results with respect to the statisti-
cal model; in addition, the similarity of OLS estimates
with estimates of tier 1 of the craggit model underlines the
importance of the first decision stage (tier 1).
Interestingly, all results on the monetary compensa-
tions again illustrate that FTCs are predominantly
regarded as very unfavorable working conditions.
Moreover, they demonstrate the high relevance of
this job feature for explaining labor market in-
equalities also in other domains of labor market re-
search, e. g., in investigating the chances of getting
workers contracted.
6 Discussion
The widespread use of FTCs yielded a large litera-
ture on employers’ motives to offer FTCs, while
workers’ rationales behind accepting fixed-term
jobs received much less attention. In this article, for
the first time an experimental approach was used
to estimate workers’ willingness to accept fixed-
term jobs. Provided that nearly all workers prefer
permanent contracts, the willingness to accept
FTCs can be regarded as an indicator of the extent
to which individuals’ relative bargaining power is
shaped by social factors (like social class or educa-
tion), as predicted by modern class and bargaining
theories.
First of all, results clearly demonstrate workers’
preference for permanent over fixed-term contracts
when confronted with jobs of otherwise compara-
ble quality. Doing so, the experimental design com-
plements existing studies in an important way: By
assessing workers’ willingness to accept FTCs while
controlling for possible compensations, selectivity
and other types of bias caused by unobserved char-
acteristics are avoided. Thus it is possible to disen-
tangle workers’ assessment of different contract
types from evaluations of further job characteris-
tics, which might represent compensations for
FTCs that are only paid to individuals with higher
bargaining power.
Second, the study reveals social inequalities regard-
ing the risk of precarious employment. Workers’
willingness to make concessions with regard to job
security is shaped by factors defining their bargain-
ing position vis--vis employers. Higher qualifica-
tions, a higher social class position, and a better fi-
nancial standing all have a strong negative impact
on the reported likelihood of accepting fixed-term
jobs, while unemployment fosters the propensity to
accept FTCs. Effects of labor market integration
and economic resources are also manifest in the
level of financial compensation required for precari-
ous contracts. Individuals in weak bargaining posi-
tions, notably low qualified or unemployed persons,
tend to be more willing to accept fixed-term jobs.
Finally, evidence with regard to the impact of labor
market context and family background is less clear
cut. For the local unemployment rate and the indus-
try-specific share of FTCs no significant effects
could be detected; a reduced willingness to accept
FTCs in case of living with an employed partner
was found only for men. Even when controlling for
qualifications and class positions, women tend to
be more willing to accept FTCs than men.
To sum up, results suggest that labor market in-
equalities are clearly shaped by social positions that
reflect specific power imbalances between employ-
ers and employees. Most factors that were tested in
this paper showed that individuals in disadvantaged
labor market positions have a high propensity of
accepting FTCs and thus a higher risk of further
weakening their bargaining position.
7 Conclusion
Previous studies showed FTCs to be widespread
among both low-skilled and high-skilled workers
(Gebel & Giesecke 2009). The evidence presented
here nevertheless reveals differences regarding
workers’ attitudes towards FTCs. Unskilled or un-
employed individuals are less likely to oppose inse-
cure jobs, while high-skilled workers’ bargaining
power allows them to be pickier about job offers:
their willingness to accept FTCs is on average lower
and also contingent on better financial trade-offs.
Not measuring these higher financial trade-offs or
other forms of compensations might lead to the
misleading conclusion that employment risks have
become largely individualized. Our findings, on the
contrary, suggest the existence of path-dependen-
cies through which social inequalities tend to re-
inforce themselves.
The interpretation of family background effects is
less straightforward. While the pattern found for
male respondents might be interpreted in terms of a
decommodifying effect of living with a second
earner, the fact that family status has no impact for
women requires explanation. There might be two
different forces cancelling each other out: the bar-
gaining power that is gained by a decommodifying
effect of another earner and the bargaining power
that is lost due to the fact of women being more
likely the second earner (Blossfeld et al. 2001), which
reduces flexibility in regard to working hours or
(geographical) workplaces. However, more research
is needed to disentangle these factors and to explain
the overall tendency of women to be more willing to
accept FTCs, regardless of their family status. More
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generally, the findings illustrate that gender inequal-
ities in employment are not only manifest in income
inequalities but also in a gender-specific willingness
to accept unfavorable working conditions.
Notwithstanding its merits, the methodology of
this study has certain limitations. First of all, the
experimental design only allowed measuring be-
havioral intentions. It might be objected that these
intentions do not allow conclusions on real behav-
ior. One reason would be the social desirability bias
in reporting them. The indirect evaluation task in
factorial surveys with many experimental factors
varying at the same time is, however, regarded as
being much more immune against this bias than
standard item questions (Mutz 2011). Moreover,
the theory of planned behavior suggests behavioral
intentions will have strong predictive power with
respect to behavior, with most discrepancies being
caused by additional information or (job) options
that were not yet available in initial planning stages
(e. g., Ajzen 1991). Put differently, the causal im-
pact of factors is likely found to be very similar be-
tween measures of intentions and real behavior (see
also Nisic & Auspurg 2009).22
There might be additional factors that are relevant
in real decisions, but as long as these do not interact
with the factors under study, one can still achieve a
valid measurement of their causal impact (Aronson
et al. 1998; Brewer 2000). Our design deliberately
focused on a limited number of decision factors.
Future research could expand on additional factors
(such as further training options or firm-specific
conversion rates of FTCs into permanent contracts)
or trade-offs beyond financial compensation (such
as the prospect of getting a subsequent permanent
job). In this context, it would be particularly inter-
esting to further investigate the role of commuting
distance, which according to our study also has a
very strong impact on job acceptance (for some re-
sults on the same data base: Abraham et al. 2013;
Auspurg et al. 2014).
With respect to the sample of respondents, unem-
ployed workers and low-income households were
deliberately oversampled. Using a more representa-
tive sample would certainly change the descriptive
results.23 We do not expect the results of hypothe-
ses tests to change, as this would only be the case if
relevant moderator variables were omitted (Aus-
purg & Hinz 2015). This is, however, very unlikely
as the respondent sample covers a very broad range
of the general population. Oversampling unem-
ployed workers leads to a higher variance in test
variables (like the employment status) and hence to
higher statistical power. Nevertheless, replicating
the results with different respondent samples would
be insightful. Validations should be based on sam-
ples with a comparably high variation in test varia-
bles and additional variables that might moderate
the tests of hypotheses (i. e., further vignette dimen-
sions or contexts that modify bargaining power,
such as social security systems).
Concerning the economic context, the positive –
though non-significant – effect of the unemploy-
ment rate suggests that a high level of regional un-
employment might weaken workers’ power to
avoid precarious jobs. Future research could use
more sophisticated measures of the local opportu-
nity structure. Local labor markets do not necessa-
rily coincide with administrative units but are
rather defined by traffic connections, commuting
flows, and other forms of connections to metropoli-
tan and industrial areas (Litzel & Mçller 2011).
Similarly, an impact of the industry-specific FTC
rate might be detected by using a more fine-grained
industry measure than the one available for this
study.
The enforceability of unfavorable working condi-
tions is certainly also linked to the degree of collec-
tive bargaining power gained by labor unions and
other forms of worker organizations, which were
only roughly captured with sector variables. Cur-
rently, many sectors experience a fragmentation of
the workforce (caused, for instance, by outsourcing
core jobs to peripheral units) that weakens collec-
tive bargaining power (Holst 2014). Future re-
search could study how changes in labor market re-
lations interfere with the impact of individual
bargaining power.
Focusing on Germany, in this study a conservative
welfare state was observed in which the workforce
still enjoys a comparatively high level of decommo-
dification, e. g. in the form of unemployment bene-
fits. In more liberal welfare states, like the UK or
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22 Given that unemployed recipients of means-tested ben-
efits are obliged to accept any job offers, social desirability
might also have influenced their stated general acceptance
of hypothetical job offers in this survey. Yet, even if their
willingness to accept jobs was overestimated in absolute
terms, this should not interfere with a reliable measure-
ment of the causal impact of experimental factors. In par-
ticular, high internal validity is the strength of all experi-
mental approaches including factorial survey methods
(Auspurg & Hinz 2015).
23 For instance, one can expect a higher willingness to ac-
cept offers that require a household move; see Abraham et
al. 2013.
US, even larger social inequalities in the distribu-
tion of bargaining power can be expected. Policy
effects could be studied by comparative studies in
the future.
To conclude, the empirical results suggest that the
risk of having a fixed-term job is apparently not
only determined by employers’ hiring practices or
flexibilization strategies. The potential to avoid in-
secure jobs is largely dependent on decommodify-
ing factors reflecting individuals’ bargaining power.
From a social policy perspective, path dependencies
between current and future labor market risks
could be avoided by the provision of decommodify-
ing resources. Previous studies have already shown
that unemployment benefits and other welfare state
transfers can reduce long-term scar effects of unem-
ployment or precarious employment, as workers
can afford longer job search periods and hence ex-
perience fewer constraints in regard to job choices
(Gangl 2004). In the study at hand, this decommo-
difying effect of a higher household income was
supported again. Similarly, as education seems to
be an important aspect of bargaining power, better
options for further training could offer stepping-
stones into permanent employment. Fixed-term
workers, unemployed persons, and low-skilled
workers have relatively low chances to get access to
further training (Bellmann et al. 2013; Hubert &
Wolf 2003). Insofar as lower education implies less
bargaining power, reduced access to further train-
ing yields a higher risk of remaining in insecure em-
ployment. The study deliberately focused on FTCs
only, but there is evidence that other forms of non-
standard work (like part-time and marginal em-
ployment) provide even stronger path-dependencies
in non-standard employment (for Germany, see
Brülle 2013). As the risks of non-standard employ-
ment are strongly shaped by social factors, they de-
serve high awareness in political and social scien-
ces.
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